Category Archives: 1

Busting the Durable Myth That U.S. Self-Defense Law Uniquely Fails to Protect Human Life

by T. Markus Funk*

(2023) Oxford U Comparative L Forum 1 at ouclf.law.ox.ac.uk | How to cite this article

Self-defense, the “first civil right,” continues to be among criminal law’s most controversial, enduring , and intuitively understood topics.[1] The February 2020 murder of Ahmaud Arbery,[2] the November 2021 Wisconsin trial of Kyle Rittenhouse,[3] the January 2023 shooting of a masked robber in a Houston taqueria,[4] and the February 2023 second-degree murder charges lodged against 73-year-old Arizona rancher George Alan Kelly for killing an allegedly trespassing migrant near the US-Mexico border[5] all have helped bring to full boil the long-simmering national debate about where the state’s monopoly on force should end and the individual’s right to rely on self-preferential force should begin.

After each of these incidents, members of the legal commentariat followed the familiar practice of swiftly offering their takes on all aspects of these flashpoint cases. Much of what they said about these cases, for good reason, sparked spirited discussion.

There is, however, one disrupting note in the constant drumbeat of lawyers, legislators, academics, reporters, and other legal observers that is routinely and frustratingly out of sync: the claim that U.S. self-defense law[6] is exceptionally severe by international standards and comparatively underappreciative of the value of human life and the need to prevent violence.

The problem with this narrative is that it fails to recognize that U.S. self-defense law is, in fact, very much within the international mainstream and, in many respects, is significantly more protective of attackers and more carefully calibrated to reduce overall societal violence than the self-defense laws of many other nations. In terms of impact, such erroneous claims seriously distract from the much-needed debate over U.S. self-defense law’s deeper public policy and moral grounding.

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One set of principles to rule them all? Parliamentary practices in France and the United Kingdom

by Marie-Elisabeth Boggio*

(2022) Oxford U Comparative L Forum 1 at ouclf.law.ox.ac.uk | How to cite this article

This paper is a short overview of my research on parliamentary practices and the comparison I make between practices in the French Parliament and in the UK Parliament. We know that both are governed by written rules. On the one hand, the UK Houses of Parliament are run according to Standing Orders and certain Parliament Acts. On the other hand, the French Chambres are governed by Internal Rules and several organic laws which are enforced by the Conseil constitutionnel(Constitutional Council). But these written rules are not enough to describe precisely and comprehensively the running of Parliaments: more rules are needed to govern the respective Houses/Chambres. These rules are unwritten and we call them “parliamentary practices”. This paper will describe the concept of “parliamentary practices”, a category on which little research has been carried out, at least in France. It will also explain the reason why a comparison between France and the United Kingdom might be of interest on this topic. Finally, there will be a comparative study of some practices to demonstrate their significance for parliamentary proceedings in both countries.

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Coronavirus measures in private law: Comparison of moratoria in the United Kingdom and Germany

by Johannes Ungerer*

(2020) Oxford U Comparative L Forum 1 at ouclf.law.ox.ac.uk | How to cite this article

The Coronavirus pandemic poses unprecedented challenges to private legal relations. These challenges demand that States provide measures that go beyond traditional private law responses such as force majeure, material adverse change or frustration. Enacting moratoria is among the steps which have been undertaken by the United Kingdom and Germany to provide necessary ‘breathing space’,[1] and is the subject of this comparative paper.
The paper will begin by looking at the general modifications in private law that have been made in response to the Coronavirus pandemic. This will be followed by an analysis of tenancies, which have been given special protection by legislators. Finally, the consequences for borrowers are addressed. The purpose of this paper is to inform about the recent legislative actions taken. This might not only be instructive for their evaluation and future amendment, but also for questions arising in cross-border settings.

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On the Diverging Conceptions of Fairness in English and Bulgarian Contract Law: The Peculiar Transformation(s) of Roman Causa

by Radosveta Vassileva*

(2019) Oxford U Comparative L Forum 1 at ouclf.law.ox.ac.uk | How to cite this article

This paper examines the distinct roles, which the Roman doctrine of ‘causa’ acquired in English and Bulgarian contract law, to challenge popular beliefs entertained by common law and comparative scholars and to demonstrate the peculiar mechanisms through which the conception of fairness in contract law evolves. While leading contemporary English scholars argue that the doctrine of consideration is a unique common law doctrine, an historical inquiry reveals that it is a direct descendant of Roman ‘causa’, which also made its way into continental systems. At the same time, many comparative scholars assert that, despite differences that may exist on the surface, the common law doctrine of consideration and the continental doctrine of ‘cause’ often reach the same results in similar circumstances. By using Bulgarian law as a case study, which has been subjected to the competing influences of Romanistic and Germanic legal traditions, this paper shows why this argument is misleading. Notably, in England, consideration remains primarily a question of form. In Bulgaria, however, turbulent political changes have created opportunities for scholarly and judicial activism. Thus ‘causa’ was moulded into a powerful tool against substantive unfairness in agreements which courts rely on even in modern times.

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Does the State Have a Compelling Interest in Searching Device Data at the Border? Emerging Approaches to Reasonable Search in Canada and the United States

by Robert Diab*

(2018) Oxford U Comparative L Forum 1 at ouclf.law.ox.ac.uk | How to cite this article

Courts in Canada and the United States currently hold warrantless and groundless device searches at the border to be reasonable. They do so by assuming the state’s pressing interest in search at the border extends to the search of device data at the border. Apex courts in both nations have yet to address the issue. Yet in recent cases on device searches on arrest (Fearon and Riley) both courts have made holdings about privacy and the state interest in device searches that run contrary to assumptions in the border search cases. In the wake of Fearon and Riley, courts in border cases have conceded the greater privacy in device data but have tended not to question assumptions about the state interest in data search at the border.

This paper examines the development of the law on border device searches in both nations with three aims. The first is to show that governments and courts have not been sufficiently critical of state interest in assessing reasonable border data searches. The second aim is to consolidate critical opinion on the nature of the state’s interest in border data searches, and to add the argument that the state has a less pressing interest in data search here than in the search of a person’s body, calling for a higher standard than reasonable suspicion. The third aim is to demonstrate that in recent reform efforts in Parliament and Congress, lawmakers have begun to question whether groundless border device searches are reasonable but have lacked clarity on state interest. The paper concludes by suggesting that reasonable search should be assessed in this context by foregrounding the question of state interest and taking an evidence-based approach, and that doing so supports a warrant standard.

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