In the view of the Acquis Group, the Proposal should not provide blanket full harmonisation. The degree of harmonisation should instead be based on the specific functions of each of the provisions and consider the effects which each item will have on the level of consumer protection in the Member States. A differentiated solution should therefore be preferred.
Quite generally, any attempt to full harmonisation which simply uses existent provisions for minimum harmonisation and couples theses with a full harmonisation rule will inevitably reduce the overall level of consumer protection in the Member States to the lowest common denominator. If such an effect is not intended, full harmonisation must be reconsidered. If such an effect is intended, this must be made explicit.
The Acquis Group also wonders whether a regulation would not be more suitable as legal instrument if full harmonisation was indeed to be achieved. Such a regulation could be made available as an optional instrument for those Member States who are ready for full harmonisation across the board.
Full harmonisation can most easily be achieved for the provisions on the exercise and effects of the right of withdrawal. The provisions on withdrawal are, to a great extent, suitable for full harmonisation because they have mostly been developed in the Member States on the basis of Community law. Moreover, in comparison with other areas of law, withdrawal as an institution operates without causing any significant unintended consequences for other areas of law, and without affecting adversely existing particular doctrines in domestic law.
In our view, full harmonisation is not appropriate for a number of other items. This includes in particular general information duties (Article 5), and also a number of specific information duties (Articles 6ff).
On its face, the Proposal seeks to exclude many more extensive information duties which are enshrined in other legislative acts of the EC, not all of which are covered by the conflict rule in Article 3.
The Proposal would also extinguish numerous information duties which presently operate under domestic law, such as duties to provide information on the dangers associated with goods, or information on how goods are to be used and maintained. This would inevitably have the effect that, at least in some Member States, businesses will be afforded a higher level of protection than consumers. Such effects are entirely inappropriate and presumably unintended.
A differentiated solution must also be found for the control of unfair terms.
In the view of the Acquis Group, full harmonisation is feasible for the general clause. If, however, Article 4 of the Proposal is intended to have the effect of closing the grey and the black lists contained in the Proposal (so that no new items can be added to either list), such an effect is not feasible. At least, it cannot be reconciled with the way in which control of standard terms operates under both existing legislation and the Proposal.
The combination of a general clause with collective procedures which lead to the prohibition of certain clauses will inevitably produce case law under which a growing number of other clauses will, under certain requirements, be generally prohibited. This applies to both grey and black clauses. In order to maintain at least a fiction of closed lists, EC institutions would have to constantly monitor case law in all Member States and frequently update the grey and black lists under the procedure envisaged by Articles 39(2) and 40 of the Proposal. This is neither practicable nor desirable. Moreover, the Proposal can hardly intend to prevent Member States from updating their statutory provisions on black and grey lists to make them more compatible with EC law as held by their courts or by the European Court of Justice. An undesired knock-on effect could be that Member States, rather than adding particular terms to the black or grey lists, simply prohibit certain clauses regardless of whether they are contained in standard terms, or used in business to consumer transactions. Harmonisation in one area of law could thus be achieved at the expense of greater disharmony in another area of law.
Moreover, the strict control of standard terms even in business to business situations which is provided under the legislation and case-law of some Member States (notably Germany) would imply for full harmonisation of the black and grey lists that businesses in such Member States would in the future be better protected against unfair terms than consumers.
The Acquis Group also takes the view that full harmonisation is not appropriate for Consumer Sales of Goods. The Proposal would not only lower the level of consumer protection which is presently afforded under Community law (see below), but also remove rules of several Member States which protect the buyers of consumer goods in a number of other respects. Last but not least, full harmonisation of the remedies for non-performance would make the integration of consumer law into the private law systems of several Member States considerably more difficult.
The Acquis Group also finds the Proposal problematic in view of a number of more specific issues. The following examples should illustrate that the present draft directive poses problems on a number of specific issues. Examples will be given below for (1) definitions, and for rules on (2) pre-contractual information duties, (3) right of withdrawal, (4) consumer sales and (5) unfair terms.
Definitions are of paramount importance for the harmonisation of EC consumer and contract law. We have seen in the past how many problems can arise from imprecise definitions in EC law. Moreover, identical terms have in the past received definitions which are inconsistent between different directives.
The Acquis Group is gravely concerned that some of the proposed definitions are imprecise and could lead to numerous problems which could easily be avoided by using the definitions employed by the ACQP and the DCFR. Three examples should suffice to illustrate the greater and lesser degrees of certainty which would be achieved by the Proposal's definitions:
A generally useful definition is given in the Proposal for "consumer" in Article 2(1):
'Consumer' means any natural person who, in contracts covered by this Directive, is acting for purposes which are outside his trade, business, craft or profession.
This definition comes close to those contained in the Acquis Principles and in the DCFR.9 However, the definition proposed by the Commission seems to suggest that a person will always be treated as consumer in situations of dual use (car to be used both for business and privately). Both Acquis Principles and DCFR would deny consumer protection in this case if the business use prevails.
On the other hand, the Acquis Group recognises that some Member States would wish to have some legal persons (trade unions or associations) to be considered consumers, while these are excluded under the Proposal as well as under both ACQP and DCFR. This question will have to be left to the political process. Member States could also be allowed to extend consumer protection rules to associations, etc.
In the view of the Acquis Group, the definition of "trader" leaves much to be desired, suggesting what we believe a too narrow definition on three counts. Article 2(2) of the Proposal defines as follows:
'trader' means any natural or legal person who, in contracts covered by this Directive, is acting for purpose relating to his trade, business, craft or profession and anyone acting in the name of or on behalf of a trader.
All three problems could be easily overcome by using the definitions provided in Article 1:202 ACQP or in Article I.-1:105 DCFR.10
The Proposal defines "sale contracts" as follows in Article 2(3):
'sales contract' means any contract of the sale of goods by the trader to the consumer including any mixed-purpose contract having as its object both goods and services.
The most important problem is that sale is not really defined. The definition of a "sale contract" as a contract for "the sale of goods" may clarify the object (goods), but not what a sale will do with those goods.
The definition thus remains very imprecise. No reference is in particular made to the transfer of the ownership in the goods. The worrying consequence is that all the rules of the Proposal which relate to "sale" can become unexpectedly broad in their scope of application. This could, for example, apply to the provision on consumer guarantees in the section on consumer sales contract, Article 29. Moreover, the extension to the "mixed-purpose contract" could raise many uncertainties. In combination, lease or rental contracts might arguably be considered as a "sale" within the definition of the Proposal. The clarity and certainty of this provision could be much improved by adopting the definition of a contract for sale given in Article IV.A-1:202 DCFR.11
Information duties are central tool of consumer protection in the current EC legislation, but are scattered over many different instruments and formulated with different scope and in different language. The Proposal has the laudable aim of harmonising information requirements, but falls considerably short of its potential.
(a) Fragmented duties
The Proposal fails in its aim to be a truly horizontal instrument. Although it formulates a number of general information requirements (Article 5), it then immediately reverts to splitting up the rules along the lines of the directives which it seeks to replace. While Article 9 regulates information requirements at least commonly for distance and off premises contracts, Article 10 and 11 contain different rules on formal requirements for distance and for off premises contracts. The Proposal thus misses the chance to formulate general information duties as overarching principles as done in Articles 2:201 - 2:208 Acquis Principles and in Articles II.-3:101 - II.-3:109 DCFR.
(b) Interaction between Proposal and other community legislation
The interaction between the information requirements of the Proposal and more specific Community instruments should be made clearer. More specific rules should in general take precedence over the general information requirements of the Proposal. The Proposal currently only makes this clear for a limited number of instruments such as the E-Commerce Directive and thus creates legal uncertainty. This includes in particular the information requirements under the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive, but also under various directives dealing with product safety.12
(c) Maximum harmonisation of pre-contractual information duties?
The Acquis Group is deeply worried about the prospect of maximum harmonisation of all pre-contractual information duties. Through maximum harmonisation, the Proposal would eradicate substantial areas of consumer protection legislation in many Member States. For example, the Proposal threatens the general duty to inform in business to consumer contracts which presently exists e.g. under Belgian and French legislation. Such statutory duties are, however, often considered as a mere codification of duties derived by the judiciary from general contract law. These are frequently linked to the notion of good faith in pre-contractual relationships or to the doctrine of culpa in contrahendo (fault in concluding a contract).
It would be an extremely far-reaching consequence of the Proposal if such information duties based on general contract law would be precluded for business to consumer relationships, whereas they could continue, where applicable, in business to business and consumer to consumer relationships. Even if the Explanatory Memorandum states on p. 7 that the Proposal is not intended to have such effects, existing case-law in the field of product liability law has demonstrated that maximum harmonisation directives are very well capable of setting aside general systems of contract or tort law.13
(d) Lack of language provision
The Acquis Group perceives it as a gap in the Proposal that it does not contain any information requirements with regard to language, i.e. on the language in which the contract will be concluded and which will be used for communications between parties after the conclusion of the contract, if this differs from the language of the commercial communication. There is clear acquis in this regard on which the Proposal could build for a more general provision.14 Rules in the Acquis Principles and the DCFR (as, for example, Articles 2:202(2) ACQP and II.-3:102(2) DCFR) could serve as an example for such a language provision.15
(e) Lack of remedies
The Proposal also gives the impression that breach of information duties will generally be without consequences. It is only for two very specific situations that Articles 6(1) and 13 provide some remedy. Again, the Proposal might have taken a leaf out of the Acquis Principles and the DCFR, which both contain a full set of remedies for breach of information requirements in Article 2:208 ACQP and Article II.-3:109 DCFR.16
(f) Prolonged withdrawal period as remedy
If a business fails to inform a consumer about his or her right to withdrawal, Article 13 of the Proposal sanctions this failure with a prolonged withdrawal period. The Acquis Group believes that the same sanction should be extended to the failure to provide other required information, as is done by a variety of directives, including e.g. the Doorstep Selling Directive, the Distance Selling Directive and the Distance Selling of Financial Services Directive. Articles 208(1) of the Acquis Principles and II.-3:109(1) DCFR contain the same rule.17
Chapter III of the Proposal deals with the criticism on the incoherence and discrepancies in the European regulation of the right of withdrawal. A rationalisation exercise is therefore also welcome for the right of withdrawal. Once more, the Proposal leaves much room for improvement.
(a) Fragmented regulation
The Proposal addresses only two of the present directives which grant to the consumer a right of withdrawal. It makes an effort to harmonise withdrawal rules for distance contracts and off premises contracts.
Nevertheless, the added value of the Proposal could be far greater if its rules on the right of withdrawal were formulated as general rules which apply also to the other withdrawal rights provided for in EC consumer law. This is the approach which is taken by both the Acquis Principles (Articles 5:101 to 5:106) and the DCFR (Articles II.-5:101 to II.-5:106). These provisions contain a set of rules which apply to all the particular rights of withdrawal under EC contract law, which can be complemented by rules for some specific situations (such as withdrawal rights in timeshare contracts, Article 5:C-01 to 5:C-02). The major advantage of this approach is that such general rules are capable of being applied to rights of withdrawal under other directives. Even if the Proposal would replace only two directives which give a withdrawal right, its provisions could provide a reference point for the ongoing review of other directives which include a withdrawal right, thus creating greater coherence of rules. The Proposal can be used to this limited effect only partially, as separate sets of rules have quite unnecessarily been kept for distance sales and for off-premises contracts.
Moreover, Article 5:A-01 ACQP and Article II.-5:201 DCFR illustrate that one single provision would be sufficient to cover the right of withdrawal for distance selling, distance selling of financial services and doorstep selling.18
(b) Withdrawal period
The Proposal harmonises the period for withdrawal at fourteen calendar days, which coincides with the time provided by Article 5:103 ACQP and Article II.-5:103 DCFR. It is disappointing, though, that the Proposal creates new distinctions with regard to the starting point of the period for withdrawal which, in the view of the Acquis Group, are difficult to justify.
For contracts for the sale of goods at a distance, it does indeed make sense that the period for withdrawal does not begin to run before the consumer has received the goods, because it is only then that he or she will be able to verify the goods.
It is difficult to understand why the Proposal fails to extend the same rule to off-premises contracts. If the consumer receives the goods on the spot, the period will start to run immediately at any rate. If, on the other hand, the consumer does not receive the goods on the spot but chooses them on the basis of a catalogue (which is rather likely due to the limited number of goods which an off premises seller can carry along), this consumer will be in the same position as a distance buyer, because this consumer will also be able to verify the goods only after receipt, when the withdrawal period under the Proposal is likely to have expired.
It is equally difficult to understand why the Proposal should distinguish between those service contracts which are concluded off premises and those concluded at a distance. In the first case, the period for withdrawal starts when the consumer signs the (written) order form or when the consumer receives a copy of the order form on a durable medium. In the second case, the withdrawal period begins when the contract is concluded. In our view, the time of the conclusion of contract would be equally suitable as a starting point for both situations.
Another weakness of the Proposal is that it fails to link the start of the withdrawal period with the consumer's receipt of an adequate notice of the withdrawal right. Such a link, which is made by both Article 5:103 ACQP and Article II.-5:103 DCFR,19 ensures that the consumer is aware of his or her right to withdrawal, a crucial precondition the right of withdrawal to become an effective means of consumer protection. It is regrettable that the Proposal does not include a similar rule.
(c) Formal requirements for withdrawal
The Proposal introduces formal requirements for withdrawal: a declaration of withdrawal is not effective unless the consumer uses a durable medium or a standard withdrawal form. The directives presently in force leave this question to the Member States, many of which have no formal requirements. Both Acquis Principles and DCFR have also chosen not to impose any formal requirements on withdrawal in order to avoid the situation that withdrawal is ineffective just because it was declared orally, tacitly (by returning goods), or because the consumer is unable to prove that he or she actually used a required form.
One may wonder whether consumers will understand what a 'durable medium' is. Moreover, even if such rule is introduced, an exception must be made if the business has failed to inform the consumer that the withdrawal will be effective only if the required form is observed. If the business has failed to do so, withdrawal should be effective regardless of form. Additionally, tacit withdrawal by returning the goods should remain possible without observance of any form. Article 5:102 ACQP and Article II.-5:102 DCFR can serve as examples.20
(d) Lenient sanction for breach of information duties
The sanctions for omitting information about the right of withdrawal vary widely in the current directives. They range from the prolongation of the period of withdrawal to approximately three months to an indefinite prolongation. In an attempt to seek a fair balance between the interests of the consumers and businesses as well as the general interest in legal certainty, the ACQP limited the period for withdrawal to one year from the time of conclusion of the contract (Article 5:103 ACQP and Article II.-5:103 DCFR).21 The Proposal sanctions omission of the information on the right of withdrawal with a prolongation of the period of withdrawal to three months after full performance (Article 13). This seems a rather lenient sanction for depriving a consumer of information that is crucial to effectively exercise of his or her right of withdrawal. The Acquis Group believes that Article 5:103 ACQP / Article II.-5:103 DCFR strike a fairer balance.
(e) Effects of withdrawal
The consequences of withdrawal are barely regulated in the current directives. They are now specified in the Proposal, and this increased legal certainty should be welcomed.
Some choices are nevertheless regrettable. Article 16 of the Proposal allows the business to withhold reimbursement until the business has received or collected the goods which the consumer has to return. We understand that the business has an interest not to pay before the goods are returned. However, regards should also be given to the diametrically opposed interest of the consumer, namely to withhold the goods until the consumer has been reimbursed. One must also keep in mind that the Proposal will no longer allow Member States to prohibit payment by the consumer during the period for withdrawal (Article 12(4)). In combination, this gives consumers very little confidence that they will indeed be reimbursed when exercising their right of withdrawal. This may seriously impair the effectiveness of this right.
Consumer sales form a core area of consumer law. Deviations from the present level of consumer protection area are especially sensitive in this area. They can undermine the accomplishments which the European Community has made for its citizens. They are particularly likely to cause political opposition against the Proposal in the Member States. For these reasons, a proposed Directive on Consumer Rights should generally avoid reducing the level of consumer protection in consumer sales as it is currently provided in a combination of Community law with the law of the Member States.
(a) Full harmonisation?
In the view of the Acquis Group, full harmonisation is therefore not appropriate for Consumer Sales of Goods because of the marked negative effects which this has on the current protection for the consumer through provisions made by the Member States (see above).
(b) Reduced rights of the consumer
A future Directive on Consumer Rights should not generally fall below the level of protection which is presently offered by the Consumer Sales Directive. It is therefore with some worry that the Acquis Group has noted that the Proposal seeks to abolish the right of the consumer to choose between repair or replacement which is presently provided in Article 3(3) of the Consumer Sales Directive. The Proposal furthermore seeks to make remedies of the consumer conditional upon the consumer informing the business of defects within a two month period. No such exclusion period is provided by the Consumer Sales Directive itself. While it gives Member States the option to introduce such a requirement, few Member States have made use of this option. Both Acquis Principles and DCFR have decided against the adoption of such an exclusion period.
(c) Passing of risk - at the expense of businesses?
On the other hand, the Proposal contains rules on the passing of risk which on closer inspection can be too harsh on businesses:
Under Article 22, delivery has to occur within thirty days or as agreed. Failure to deliver on time entitles the consumer to a refund of any sums paid within seven days from the schedules delivery date. This looks like a sound rule at first sight, but lacks precision. For example, if delivery occurs too late by one day, the consumer will be entitled to a refund. In the view of the Acquis Group, this provision makes sense if the business does not deliver at all. However, business should not have to refund the money if delivery is only marginally late.
Similarly, Article 23 introduces the basic rule that risk passes when goods are delivered to the consumer. If an attempt to deliver is made and the consumer has not taken reasonable steps to take delivery, the risk passes at the agreed delivery date. Again this provision looks sound at first sight, but suffers from uncertainty. If no agreement has been made about the delivery date, would the "time of delivery as agreed by the parties" be the last day of the thirty-day period? Similarly, where a delivery period rather than a specific date were agreed, would it be the last day of that period? Both assumptions could produce results which are unduly harsh on businesses.
Overall, the provisions on risk and delivery require further development and clarification.
(d) Problematic formulations: choice of remedies
A further instance where good intentions have succumbed to deficient drafting is Article 26(4), which sets out the circumstances under which the consumer is given the free choice between all available remedies. The consumer is, for example, given this choice if the business refuses to provide any remedy. But does this cover the situation where the business disputes the existence of a non-conformity, or is this limited to the case that the business accepts that there is a non-conformity but refuses to provide a remedy? In practice, the first is the far more likely situation, and Article 26 should make clear that it is covered. At a more practical level, the notional free choice given to the consumer will almost certainly require court involvement: if the business has already refused to act on one occasion, it is unlikely that it will react differently to the consumer's demand for a different remedy.
(e) Complex mechanisms: Article 26
More generally, Article 26 is very complex, and one may query whether this can be made to work practically, especially in the cross-border context. The practicalities of returning goods to a business for repair or replacement can be an impediment to efficient remedies in a domestic, or even local, context. This impediment is likely to become even more significant in the context of a cross-border transaction. In consequence, Article 26(4) may be of limited practical workability. For example, sub-paragraph (d) requires that the business must have failed three times to cure a particular defect before the consumer is given the free choice. How many consumers would be willing to return the goods to the business for repair (or replacement) more than once, let alone three times? It seems much more likely that a consumer would seek an alternative, but quicker, way of resolving this problem.
(f) Increased exposure of final seller
Moreover, consumer protection should not lead to the situation in which the final seller of goods is to carry the corresponding burdens alone, even where the producer or another business in the distribution chain is responsible for the non-conformity of the goods. Article 4 of the Consumer Sales Directive requires Member States to give the final seller a right of redress. It is regrettable that the Proposal contains no such provision on the redress of the seller, which is currently in the process of being adopted to the Acquis Principles.
The Proposal grants damages to the consumer in Article 27(2). The Commission should consider specifying what this involves, along the lines of Articles 8:401ff ACQP or Articles III.-3:701ff DCFR.
The Acquis Group welcomes that the Proposal includes provisions on the protection of consumers from unfair terms, agrees that these should be developed from the existing Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Directive, and also welcomes various improvements which have been made in the wording, in particular relating to terms which are considered to be unfair.
(a) Full harmonisation?
However, unlike the Proposal, the Acquis Group does not believe that a full harmonisation of all provisions on unfair terms can be achieved at the present stage (see above).
(b) Scope of controlled terms: main obligations
Given that the Proposal aims for full harmonisation, it should be made clearer that the scope of its provisions on unfair terms excludes terms which define the main obligations, such as payment of the purchase price. This could avoid a misunderstanding, namely that the Proposal would exclude any legislation by Member States which regulates main contractual duties, as is common in the legal culture of some member states (such as that of the Scandinavian states; cf. Section 36 of the Contracts Act).
(c) Lack of flexibility
It has been mentioned above that full harmonisation of the black and grey lists could cause serious friction with the mechanisms of collective procedures, and could trigger a constant need to monitor and expand the lists by way of legislation (see above).
(d) Jurisdiction clauses
The black list contained in the Proposal should also include terms which confer exclusive jurisdiction for all disputes arising under the contract on the court for the place where the business in domiciled, following ECJ C-240/98 (Oceano Grupo). Both Acquis Principles (Article 6:304) and the DCFR (Article II.-9:409) contain such a provision. Article 6:304 ACQP).22
(e) Arbitration clauses
Annex II (c) of the Proposal contains a provision taken from the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Directive which has shown to be lacking precision. It remains unclear what "arbitration not covered by legal provisions" means. The Proposal misses the chance to clarify the main outstanding issues. Are these only procedural standards as stated in national arbitration laws, or is this to be understood regardless of the applicable substantive standards, or even regardless of potentially prohibitive costs? Because of the political nature of these questions, the Acquis Principles have refrained from providing the answers, which the legislator would now have an opportunity to give.
(f) Confusing inclusion with transparency?
Article 31(2), which provides that the consumer must have a real opportunity of becoming acquainted with standard terms before conclusion of the contract, is written as a provision on transparency. In the view of the Acquis Group, this should be rewritten as a provision on inclusion. If no such opportunity was available, the standard terms in question must not form part of the contract.
The Acquis Group strongly supports the main goal of the Proposal for a Directive on Consumer Rights, namely to revise the acquis communautaire in order to create greater coherence of existing legislation.
However, in the view of the Acquis Group the present Proposal falls significantly short of achieving this goal. Moreover, in the view of the Acquis Group, the Proposal would affect adversely the present interplay between EC law and domestic law in this area, could obstruct rather than promote the ongoing process of Europeanization of private law, and would fail to achieve any significant advantage for the internal market.
Our main criticisms can be summarized as follows:
1. Fragmented approach. The Proposal joins a minority of existing directives on consumer law. The criteria for their selection remain unclear. The Proposal fails to rise sufficiently above piecing those four directives together, and thus to make significant advances in establishing general rules on consumer law. It uses terminology inconsistently, and employs some obscure language, as well as ambivalent, redundant and inaccurate terminology.
2. Full harmonisation? The Proposal envisages full harmonisation throughout without making an attempt to distinguish between areas where this is presently feasible and those where this is not.
3. Level of consumer protection. A (possibly unintended) result of full harmonisation in some unsuitable areas is that the overall level of protection of consumers within the EU would be lowered, with the effect that in some Member States in some situations, businesses would enjoy a higher level of protection than consumers.
4. Detail criticism. The present Position Paper suggests improvements for some key definitions and provisions on information duties, right of withdrawal, consumer sales and unfair terms.
5. Lack of coordination with Common Frame of Reference. It is regrettable that no attempt has been made to coordinate the consumer law acquis revision with the current elaboration of a common frame of reference for European Contract Law. Both the Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR) and the Acquis Principles (ACQP) provide a coherent terminology which can apply for the entire EC private law, as well as numerous examples for how the fragmented approach which characterises the present Proposal could be overcome in favour of a true harmonisation.
This Position Paper has been adopted by the Redaction Committee of the
Acquis Group. A printed version will appear in: Hans Schulte Nölke
and Lubox Tichy (eds.), Perspectives for European Consumer Law: Towards
a Directive on Consumer Rights and Beyond, Sellier 2009.
2 COM(2008) 614 final.
3 Principles of the Existing EC Contract Law (Acquis Principles), Contract I: Pre-contractual Obligations, Conclusion of Contract, Unfair Terms (2007); Contract II: General Provisions, Delivery of Goods, Package Travel and Payment Services (to appear shortly).
4 Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of European Private Law. Draft Common Frame of Reference (Outline Edition), prepared by the Study Group on a European Civil Code and the Research Group on EC Private Law (Acquis Group) (2009).
5 Green Paper on the Review of the Consumer Acquis, COM (2006) 744 final.
2:204 ACQP: Clarity and form of information
1:305 ACQP: Textual form
8 The similar wording of Article 5 paragraph 1 of the Consumer Credit Directive leaves it equally unclear in at least six languages whether or not credit providers are under an obligation to use the Standard European Consumer Credit Information. These informations "werden mitgeteilt", "sont fournies", "sono fornite", "se facilitará", "wordt ... verstrekt" and "shall be provided..." /
1:201 ACQP: Consumer
Article 1:202 ACQP: Business
Article IV. A. - 1:202 DCFR: Contract for sale
12 Such as Directive 2001/95/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 December 2001 on general product safety (General Product Safety directive); Council directive 76/768 of 27 July 1976 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to cosmetic products (Cosmetics directive).
13 ECJ 25.4.2002, case C-183/00 (González Sánchez),  ECR I-3901.
14 Such as Art. 42 (4) (c) Payment Services Directive; Art. 3 (g) Distance Selling of Financial Services Directive, and Art. 10 E-Commerce Directive.
Article 2:202 ACQP: Information duties in marketing towards
consumers (similar Article II.-3:102 DCFR)
Article 2:208 ACQP: Remedies for breach of information duties
(similar Article II.-3:109 DCFR, see also following note)
See last note for Article 2:208(1) ACQP.
Article 5:A-01 ACQP: Right to withdraw from contracts
negotiated away from business premises
Article 5:103 ACQP: Withdrawal period
Article 5:102 ACQP: Exercise of a right of withdrawal
21 See note 19.
Article 6:304 ACQP: List of unfair terms
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University of Oxford.